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EYES ON THE ROAD PROGRAM IN
TAIWAN―INFORMATION PRIVACY
ISSUES UNDER THE TAIWAN
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT
CHEN-HUNG CHANG*
ABSTRACT
In Taiwan a nationwide highway electronic toll collection (ETC)
system, launched in 2014, which uses radio-frequency identification
(RFID) technology to conduct toll collection, and an unintended effect is
that the ETC system functions as a massive vehicle surveillance
program that captures drivers‘ location data. This article will discuss a
number of incidents of data mismanagement by the ETC operator;
these incidents underscore the salient information privacy concerns of
individuals when an organization that handles so much personal data
does not take privacy seriously and is ill prepared to protect the
massive amount of data it possesses.
Moreover, the ETC case illustrates the conflicts of interest between
data subjects and the government when the latter intends to use the
location data of individuals for either criminal investigations or
espionage activities. By analyzing the ETC privacy issues in three
dimensions―ETC operator vs. drivers, ETC operator vs. government,
and government vs. drivers—this essay will examine whether Taiwan‘s
privacy laws are sufficient to adequately address the conflicts of
interest among data subject, data controller, and the government. The
ETC scenario further involves new privacy challenges presented by new
technologies. Particularly important is the issue of geographical
location (geo-location) data protection. This essay will examine the
respective privacy rules under which corporations and the government
may lawfully access drivers‘ geo-location data and evaluate whether
such rules are adequate.
In the United States, geo-location data is also raising troubling
privacy concerns. As a comparative perspective, it is worth exploring
145
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the privacy issues concerning geo-location data under the Fourth
Amendment. This article highlights the privacy doctrines previously
outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court and examines whether they are
still adequate to respond to privacy threats posed by new technologies.
This article also provides a perspective for U.S. information privacy
reform to better protect information privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2014, Taiwan officially launched a nationwide highway
electronic toll collection (ETC) system, which is a distance-based toll
collection system designed to allow highway users to drive through the
toll plaza without having to slow down to pay the toll. The ETC system
was built and is operated by a Taiwanese based company, Far Eastern
Electronic Toll Collection Co, Ltd. (FE-Toll),1 which was founded to
undertake the construction and operation of the ETC system. FE-Toll
won the bidding and was chosen by Taiwan‘s National Freeway Bureau
(NFB) to build and operate the nation‘s first national highway ETC
project.2 By using radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology,3
vehicles are required to install an electronic tag (eTag) to connect with
the ETC system. When vehicles pass through the electronic collection
gates, the driving distance and charges are automatically recorded.
Moreover, the ETC system uses cameras equipped with an automatic
license plate reader to scans and capture the license plate numbers of
vehicles without an eTag to send a bill to the registered car owners to

*
S.J.D. Candidate, American University Washington College of Law. Email:
chihshein@gmail.com. I would like to thank Michael Carroll, Amy Tenney, and Leesa
Klepper at American University Washington College of Law for their valuable comments
and guidance on my research and writing of this paper. I would also like to extend my
gratitude to Adam Florek, R. Joseph Cook and the production staff of Journal of
Information Technology & Privacy Law for their assistance in preparing this paper for
publication.
1. Company Overview, FAR EASTERN ELECTRONIC TOLL COLLECTION CO.,
http://www.fetc.net.tw/externalFETC/english/en_01.html (last visited July 28, 2014).
2. Milestones, FAR EASTERN ELECTRONIC TOLL COLLECTION CO.,
http://www.fetc.net.tw/en/milestones.html (last visited July 28, 2014).
3. Oleg Kobelev, Big Brother on a Tiny Chip: Ushering in the Age of Global
Surveillance through the use of Radio Frequency Identification Technology and the Need
for Legislative Response, 6 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 325, 326 (2004) ("RFID is a technology that
allows companies and governments to implant tiny and virtually undetectable microchips
or ‗tags‘ with antennas into almost any product or animal, including humans. Predicted
by MIT researchers to become the most pervasive computer technology in history, most
RFID tags do not require any external power source and can transmit information via
radio waves when the tag enters the reception field of the nearest scanner. RFID tags are
commonly used to store an Electronic Product Code (‗EPC‘) that assigns a unique
identifier to every RFID chip, thereby allowing fast, efficient, and cost-effective inventory
tracking.") (footnote omitted).
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collect toll payment.4 With the implementation of the ETC system, all
traditional manpower tollbooths in Taiwan have been removed, and no
manual fee collection lanes will be available.5
Although the original goal of the ETC was to shorten the travel
time on highways by employing a stable and efficient electronic toll
collection system across the country, unexpected privacy concerns have
been expressed over the widespread collection of data by the ETC
system.
The issue concerns not just the information users are
requested to submit to FE-Toll when signing up to join the ETC
program, such as user name, address, national identification number,
car registration, and credit/debit card numbers for toll charges. ETC is
more than a check-out counter for the use of highway services.
Numerous electronic gates have been installed on the highways to
conduct electronic surveillance on all vehicles entering the highway 24
hours a day, 365 days a year. To perform the task of collecting e-tolls,
the ETC device monitors and records vehicles‘ use of the highway,
including the date, time, distance driven, location, and movement of the
vehicle.6 An unintended effect is that the ETC system functions as a
massive vehicle surveillance program that captures drivers‘ location
data. For the purpose of this article, driver data collected by FE-Toll,
including personal identifiers and travel records, are collectively
referred to as ―E-Toll data.‖
The ETC system has posed threats to information privacy. This
article will discuss a number of incidents of data mismanagement by
FE-Toll, underscoreing the salient information privacy concerns of
individuals when an organization that handles so much personal data
does not take privacy seriously and is ill prepared to protect the
massive amount of data it possesses. There are concerns over FE-Toll‘s
mismanagement of data for purposes beyond toll collection without
drivers‘ consent. Many companies, not only FE-Toll, are trying to
maximize the benefit of personal data by treating personal data as a
commodity for sale, sharing data with third parties, or using data to
analyze and gauge customer behavior in a manner that deviates from
the scope of data use originally agreed upon.

4. See 林浩昇 [Lin Hao Sheng], 每月上2次 不裝eTag行得通 [Using highway without
eTag is workable if you only access highway twice a month], 蘋果日報 [APPLE DAILY] (June
10, 2013),
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/supplement/20130610/35073745/.
5. See 國道計程上路 收費站「關門不關燈」[A Distance-based Toll Collection System
Has Been Launched on Highway; Tollbooths Are Shut Down], 自由時報 [LIBERTY TIMES]
(Dec. 30, 2013), http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/742622.
6. See 朱致宜 [Zhu Zhi Yi], 個資看透透 徐旭東變「全民公敵」？ [Personal Data Are
Becoming Transparent; Shu-Shu-Dong Is the Enemy of All Citizens?], 財訊 [WEALTH
MAG.], Jan. 15, 2014, http://www.ettoday.net/news/20140115/316568.htm.
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Tension over privacy is not limited to FE-Toll and drivers. It also
arises between FE-Toll and public sectors when the latter attempt to
access the vehicle surveillance database. On several occasions, the
government has expressed interest in accessing the comprehensive
location data to address national security concerns, to assist in criminal
investigation, or to gathering political intelligence.7 How companies
should respond to these requests for access to personal data causes a
dilemma between sustaining consumer trust in business and resisting
pressure from the government. There are also issues regarding the
limits of information sharing between private sectors and the
government.
Moreover, the establishment of the ETC involves a combination of
efforts from the private and public sectors. If we perceive this issue
from the perspective that FE-Toll is entrusted by the government as a
―contractor‖ to operate the ETC system, FE-Toll is a quasi-public utility
when it is carrying out the highway fee collection task. This leads to
the issue of government collection and use of personal data, and thus,
privacy tensions arise between individuals and the government. The
ETC case illustrates the conflicts of interest between data subjects and
the government when the latter intends to use an individual‘s location
data for criminal investigation or espionage activities. How to reconcile
personal privacy with the interests of society is a complex issue,
especially when an individual‘s interest can hardly have equal standing
with the powerful public interest.
By analyzing the ETC privacy issue from three perspectives―FEToll vs. drivers, FE-Toll vs. government, and government vs. drivers—
this article will examine whether Taiwan privacy laws, primarily the
Taiwan Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), 8 which is the national
law governing information privacy protection, are sufficient to
adequately address the conflicts of interest among data subjects, the
data controller, and the government. This article identifies the problem
under the PDPA that, although specific rules and legal obligations have
been created for the collection, use and storage of personal data, a
problematic exemption to these obligations will largely undermine the
goal of data protection. A particular issue is that the PDPA allows
7. See 葉志堅 [Ye Zhi Jian], ETC成監控系統？！ 警政署發文監控全民 [ETC Turns
to Be a Surveillance System?! The Criminal Investigation Bureau Sent Notice to Monitor
All Citizen], 今日新聞 [NOWNEWS] (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.nownews.com/n/2014/01/10/1085265.
8. Personal Information Protection Act (2010) (Taiwan), translated at
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627 (The PDPA is
originally in Taiwanese. The PDPA is also called Personal Information Protection Act in
some Taiwan law databases when said law is translated in English. There is no official
English version or translation of PDPA in Taiwan.)
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companies and the government to be exempted from the data protection
principles if a public interest is involved. Due to a lack of specific
factors regarding when and how public interest may justify the breach
of personal privacy, this exemption is prone to abuse for data controllers
because, under the umbrella of public interest, it allows them to bypass
the obligation to safeguard privacy and breach the promise of personal
data protection. It is critical to draw a line for accessing personal data
in the name of public interest to minimize the controversies through the
misuse of technologies resulting in surveillance of citizens without
probable cause.
The ETC scenario further involves new privacy challenges
presented by new technologies. Particularly important is the issue of
geographical location (geo-location) data protection. New technologies
such as the ETC system have enabled the tracking of drivers‘ locations
and movements and have generated a new category of personal
information―geo-location data―that did not exist before mobile devices
and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) became widely available.
Compared to traditional personal identifiers, such as names, social
security numbers or a person‘s physical characteristics, geo-location
data seems to be non-personal because the data merely indicate the
geographic data of the device (such as cars in the ETC case) and do not
directly reveal the identity of a person. However, the fact that geolocation data can be easily linked to personal identifiers (in the ETC
case, all ETC users are required to submit their personal identifiers
along with the vehicle identifiers to FE-Toll) and can be used to single
out an individual‘s location and movements has made it necessary to
include geo-location data in the scope of personal data. The possibility
of using geo-location to trace drivers‘ whereabouts makes the locationbased data even more sensitive than traditional personal identifiers.
All the complexity of privacy elements and the corresponding privacy
rules of geo-location data were obviously not considered and anticipated
when the PDPA was drafted. This article will examine the respective
PDPA rules under which corporations and the government may
lawfully access drivers‘ geo-location data and evaluate whether such
rules are adequate.
II. INFORMATION PRIVACY AND THE TAIWAN PERSONAL DATA
PROTECTION ACT (PDPA)
A. THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION PRIVACY UNDER THE TAIWAN
CONSTITUTION
The Taiwan Constitution does not contain the word ―privacy‖ but,
the right to privacy has been upheld on numerous occasions by the
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Taiwan Constitutional Court (Taiwan‘s highest court, which has the
ultimate decision-making authority on questions of the Taiwan
Constitution). The Taiwan Constitutional Court has recognized privacy
as a constitutional right:
The right to privacy, though not clearly enumerated under the
Constitution, is an indispensable fundamental right protected under
Article 22 of the Constitution because it is necessary to preserve
human dignity, individuality, and the wholeness of personality
development, as well as to safeguard the freedom of private living
space from interference and the freedom of self-control of personal
information.9

The Taiwan Constitutional Court further interprets the concept of
privacy to expressly recognize the right to information privacy:
As far as the right to information privacy is concerned, which regards
the self-control of personal information, it is intended to guarantee
that the people have the right to decide whether or not to disclose
their personal information, and, if so, to what extent, at what time, in
what manner and to what people such information will be disclosed. It
is also designed to guarantee that the people have the right to know
and control how their personal information will be used, as well as the
right to correct any inaccurate entries contained in their
information.10

In a recent dispute stemming from the conflicts of freedom of
expression and the right to privacy, the Constitutional Court again
recognized that the Taiwan Constitution protects the rights of
individuals to have their personal information remain private.11 This is
not an absolute right, and the Court held that whether information
privacy may override free press shall be subject to the examination of
necessity and proportionality.12

9. J.Y. Interp. No. 585, at reasoning ¶ 17 (Dec. 15, 2004) (Taiwan), translated in
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=585 (the quoted
language is a translation from Taiwanese to English by the author).
10. J.Y. Interp. No. 603, at holding ¶ 1 (Sept. 28, 2005) (Taiwan), translated in
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=603 (the quoted
language is a translation from Taiwanese to English by the author).
11. See J.Y. Interp. No. 689, at reasoning ¶ 7 (July 29, 2011) (Taiwan), translated in
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/eng/FINT/FINTQRY03.asp?Y1=2011&M1=&D1=&Y2=&M2=&D
2=&cno=&kw=&btnSubmit=Search&sdate=20110000&edate=99991231&keyword=&page
=3&total=35&seq=30.
12. See J.Y. Interp. No. 689, at reasoning ¶ 7 (July 29, 2011) (Taiwan), translated in
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=689.
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B. TAIWAN PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT (PDPA)
1. Background: From a Sector-Specific to a Comprehensive Model
Taiwan has the unique experience of having adopted two of the
world‘s most common data protection regimes at different stages. The
European Union (EU) took the lead in implementing comprehensive
privacy data protection laws applicable to all types of personal data
across all sectors.13 On the other hand, the United States is a notable
example of a government that protects personal data through a sectorspecific framework with fragmental privacy laws covering certain
information categories for specific industries. 14 In 1995, Taiwan
enacted its first law specifically addressing requirements of the
collection, processing, and use of personal data―the Computerprocessed Personal Data Protection Act (CPDPA). 15
This Act
incorporated the fair information privacy practices and principles
developed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) in 1980. 16 CPDPA adopted a sector-based privacy
model that aimed to regulate data processing by government agencies,
hospitals, schools, and private companies in certain industries such as
telecommunications, banking, securities, insurance, and credit
investigation. These industries were required to register with the
competent authorities before they could collect, process, and use
automated personal data.17
There are additional data privacy
protection requirements to address the particular needs or problems in
numerous laws, such as the Financial Holding Company Act,18 the
13. See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 908-12
(2009).
14. Id. at 913.
15. Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Act, Presidential Decree Ref. No.
ROC-President-(I)-Yi-5960 (1995) (Taiwan), available at
http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawOldVer_Vaild.aspx?PCODE=I0050021 (only the
Taiwanese version of the Act is currently available).
16. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF
PERSONAL DATA (1980), available at
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransbo
rderflowsofpersonaldata.htm (the principles are the ―Collection Limitation Principle, Data
Quality Principle, Purpose Specification Principle, Use Limitation Principle, Security
Safeguards Principle, Openness Principle, Individual Participation Principle, and
Accountability Principle.‖).
17. Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Act art. 3, cl. 7, Presidential
Decree Ref. No. ROC-President-(I)-Yi-5960 (1995) (Taiwan), translated in http://twseregulation.twse.com.tw/EN/law/DAT06.aspx?FLCODE=FL010627&FLDATE=19950811&
LSER=001.
18. Financial Holding Company Act arts. 42-43 (2009) (Taiwan), translated in
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL006621.
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Telecommunications Act,19 the Tax Levy Act,20 the Settlement of Labor
Disputes Act,21 the Protection of Children and Youths Welfare and
Rights Act,22 the Sexual Assault Crime Prevention Act,23 and
Mental Health Law.24
A recent trend is that technology advancement has enabled the
widespread collecting, processing, and transmitting of personal data by
any individual, company, organization, or group. This trend, along with
the earlier fragmented approach of a limited data protection obligation
to certain sectors of industries, falls short of the goal of data protection.
Therefore, the Taiwanese government decided to establish an
information privacy protection framework of strong overall protection
laws, regardless of the industry of the data controllers, which is not
limited to automatically processed data. The Taiwan Personal Data
Protection Act (PDPA) was passed by the Legislative Yuan (the
Congress) on May 26th, 2010, and has been in effect since October 1st,
2012.25 The PDPA generally follows the privacy principles approved by
the Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation (APEC) in 200426 and the 1995
EU Data Protection Directive.27 The PDPA not only regulates private
entities but also imposes rules for data collection, use, and disclosure by
the public sector. This approach is supported by and is coherent with
Taiwan‘s constitutional obligation to protect citizens‘ information
privacy.28 This empowers the government to take an active stance,

19. Telecommunications Act arts. 6-7 (2013) (Taiwan), translated in
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL012763.
20. Tax Collection Act art. 33 (2014) (Taiwan), translated in
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL005933.
21. Act for Settlement of Labor-Management Disputes art. 24 (2009) (Taiwan),
translated at http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL014924.
22. The Protection of Children and Youths Welfare and Rights Act art. 21 (2011)
(Taiwan), translated in
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL024905.
23. Sexual Assault Crime Prevention Act arts. 9-10 (2011) (Taiwan), translated in
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL004532.
24. Mental Health Act arts. 24-25 (2007) (Taiwan), translated in
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL013543.
25. Personal Information Protection Act (2010) (Taiwan), available at
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627.
26. APEC SECRETARIAT, APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK (2005), available at
http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-andInvestment/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx.
27. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter EU Data
Protection Directive], available at http://www.dutchdpa.nl/downloads_wetten/dir199546_part1_en.pdf.
28. See J.Y. Interp. No. 689, at reasoning ¶ 6 (July 29, 2011) (Taiwan), translated in
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/eng/FINT/FINTQRY03.asp?Y1=2011&M1=&D1=&Y2=&M2=
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instead of leaving the matter to industry discretion, to lay out the
foundations of privacy protection principles so that businesses will
know which line they should never cross.
2. Content, Basic Principles and Problems of the PDPA
The PDPA comprises fifty-six articles and governs several key
issues: notification requirement, data subject‘s rights, legitimate
criteria for data collection, processing and use, international data
transfer, data security, data breach notification, sanctions, and
regulatory control (enforcement).29 The PDPA offers an extensive
protection scope to apply data protection obligations to all government
agencies and private entities (defined as ―a natural person, legal person
or any other body‖).30 Following this goal, that the PDPA should be
able to encompass activities involving the processing of personal data as
broadly as possible, personal data 31 in the PDPA is defined as a broad
concept to encompass any sort of information that can be used to
directly or indirectly identify, or makes possible the identification of a
natural person.32
The PDPA recognizes that there may be circumstances where the
application of the PDPA would be excessively burdensome on social
activities. Exceptions are made where data are processed purely for
personal or family activities, for video and audio data collected in public
venues, or at public activities that are not linked to other personal
information.33 Among other requirements and obligations, the PDPA
&D2=&cno=&kw=&btnSubmit=Search&sdate=20110000&edate=99991231&keyword=&p
age=3&total=35&seq=30.
29. See Personal Information Protection Act (2010) (Taiwan), available at
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627.
30. Personal Information Protection Act art. 2, ¶ 1, cl. 8 (2010) (Taiwan), available
at http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627 (the quoted
language is a translation from Taiwanese to English by the author).
31. For purpose of this essay, personal data and personal information are used
interchangeably and do not refer to different definitions.
32. The personal data protected under the PDPA include:
[N]ame, date of birth, I.D. Card number, passport number, characteristics,
fingerprints, marital status, family, education, occupation, medical record,
medical treatment, genetic information, sexual life, health checks, criminal
records, contact information, financial conditions, social activities and/or
other information which may directly or indirectly be used to identify a
living natural person.
Personal Information Protection Act art. 2, ¶1, cl. 1 (2010) (Taiwan), available at
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627 (the quoted
language is a translation from Taiwanese to English by the author).
33. Article 51 of the PDPA excludes the following activities and data from the
application of the PDPA: ―1. When a natural person collects, processes or uses personal
data purely for personal or family activities; and 2. The image or audio data that are
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requires written consent from the data subject whose personal data is
collected, processed, or used, with a few exceptions.34 Before providing
written consent, the data subject must be provided with adequate notice
before the entity first collects personal data.35 The data subject has the
right to request that the data controller delete or stop using the
personal data when the originally intended purpose no longer exists,
unless the laws state otherwise or the data subject has given written
consent.36
The PDPA was designed to provide an overarching protection of
personal data with an extensive scope but has faced a number of
problems regarding its implementation due to incorrect perception of
the law. Some have expressed concern that the rules are not strict
enough for certain data,37while others complain that the same level of
strictness will discourage innovation in technology development.38 The
complexity is compounded because not all data is created equal. The
value of data varies depending on the nature and the context of
application, thus calling for different levels of privacy protection.
Similarly, personal data is used for various reasons. For instance, the
same health data may be applied for multiple purposes, ranging from
generating commercial profits to supporting academic research. When
non-sensitive personal data is at odds with public safety or the wellbeing of the country, it may be justifiable to breach an individual‘s
privacy right in furtherance of the public interest. On the other hand, if

collected, processed or used in public venues or at public activities and are not combined
with other pieces of personal data.‖ Id. at art. 51, ¶1 (2010) (Taiwan), available at
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627 (the quoted
language is a translation from Taiwanese to English by the author).
34. Id. at art. 15-16, 19-20.
35. Id. at art. 8.
36. Id. at art. 11.
37. One example being health information which has the potential to disclose a vast
amount of personal information. In the view that health data may lead to higher risk of
privacy invasion than other types of data, more restriction on the use of health data are
necessary. See Chen-Mei Fan Chiang, Medical Research and Personal-data Protection—
Take Japanese Epidemiology Research as the Basis, 10 TECH. L. REV. 61, 104 (2013).
38. In Liu Zuo-Guo v. Taiwan Mobile, No. 103-Bei-Hsiao-1360 (Taipei Dist. Ct. Oct.
20, 2014), the defendant, Taiwan Mobile Co., Ltd. argued that the court wrongfully
interpreted the Taiwan Personal Data Protection Act when it failed to note that the
subject information in the particular case (which is the name of cell phone service
provider that the plaintiff engaged services with) is less sensitive and shall not be subject
to the same level of strictness of other personal data. The court‘s final decision that the
phone service provider has invaded personal privacy has been challenged that it is likely
to impede technological innovation. See 洪聖壹 [Hong Sheng-Yi], M+Messenger遭判違反個
資 台哥大：觀念錯誤、將上訴 [M+Messenger Is Ruled by the Court to Have Violated the
Personal Data Protection Act; Taiwan Mobile: the Judgment Is Incorrect And It Will File
an Appeal], 東森新聞雲[ETTODAY], Oct. 28, 2014,
http://www.ettoday.net/news/20141028/418979.htm.
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a country threatened by terrorism plans to establish a national
biometric database, where all citizens will be required to submit their
facial and other physical identifiers for national security or prevention
of crime, it is much more difficult to justify a privacy breach. It will not
be easy to strike a balance between these prominent interests.
This article notes that a fundamental concept should be clarified in
which the comprehensive model is aimed to lay out bottom-line
standards for privacy protection rather than replace all other advanced
privacy legislations if more layers of protection are considered. As
noted in the legislative rationale of the PDPA, the Act is to set out the
general and minimum requirements of personal data protection. A
correct understanding of Taiwan‘s information privacy law is that the
PDPA shall function as the baseline privacy protection framework, with
additional layers of regulations and rules applicable to particular
industry sectors, types of data, or specific topics. With this concept in
mind, in regard to balancing the conflicting interests between
individual privacy and the free flow of personal data in complex
scenarios, one should carefully take into account all the competing
interests involved to seek a balance, instead of mechanically applying
the rules. In the current PDPA, some of the rules are poorly written
and fail to consider the various possibilities of conflicts between
personal privacy and the ability to freely use personal information. One
example is an exemption to obtaining consent from a data subject to
collect or use of personal data for the public interest, which will likely
undermine privacy protections, if one does not take notice of the
different contexts of personal data involved and the public interest
pursued.
III. ETC‘S INFORMATION PRIVACY ISSUES
A number of incidents of data mismanagement by FE-Toll have
drawn concern over the troubling invasion of privacy of millions of
drivers across the country. FE-Toll‘s mass surveillance of nationwide
vehicle data comes at a time when the Taiwanese PDPA is newly
implemented and provides a framework to examine whether the PDPA
is sufficient to protect individuals‘ information privacy. This article
notes that while many incidents occurred due to FE-Toll‘s lack of
awareness of its data safeguard obligations and failure to train
responsible employees for information handling practices, the ETC case
underscores a number of loopholes in the PDPA, primarily an
exemption to a ―notice and consent‖ requirement39 that could be
39. Most information privacy protection legal regimes in the world are developed
under the control–driven notion, which focuses on the autonomy of the data subjects in
deciding whether and how their data can be used. Information privacy protection policy is
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misused by a government or private entity to act against or without
drivers‘ consents in the name of public interest. A peculiar dimension
for academic research in the ETC case is that the ETC system has the
unintended effect of functioning as a massive vehicle surveillance
program to capture drivers‘ location data. It raises issues that include
whether the basic privacy principles should be the same when it comes
to consent, notice, and data use requirements, in view that drivers in
fact have no real choice but are mandated to accept the surveillance if
they want to use the highways.
A. CAN FE-TOLL USE DRIVERS‘ PERSONAL DATA FOR NON-TOLLCOLLECTION PURPOSES?
1. The Violation of Use Limitation Principle
The highly anticipated ETC program did not have a good start, and
one of the misconducts of FE-Toll‘s handling of personal data was the
disclosure of drivers‘ personal contact information to others without the
data subject‘s consent for unjustifiable reasons. Numerous drivers were
incorrectly charged on ETC toll roads operated by FE-Toll.40
Complaints range from double charges and incorrect rates to FE-Toll‘s
mismanagement of eTag accounts by withdrawing prepaid amounts
when the account owner had not yet traveled on the highway. 41 One of
the outrageous mistakes that may lead to a violation of the PDPA arises
from an incident where FE-Toll misread the plate numbers, failed to
collect the toll fee from the responsible driver, and charged another
driver instead.42 When the driver received the wrong bill and contacted
FE-Toll customer service for bill correction and a refund, FE-Toll
instructed the complainant to contact the responsible driver directly for
fee reimbursement.43 In this incident, it would be much more sensible,
for both customer service and data protection reasons, if FE-Toll
primarily built upon notice-and-choice (informed consent) and transparency of data
collection and processing, to ensure data subject has full control over his own data. See
Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DAEDALUS 32, 34
(2011); see also Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 (2013).
40. See 曾懿晴 [Ceng Yi Qing], 遠通重複扣款 還靈異飄移溢收 [FE-Toll Double
Charges Toll Fees and Mischarges Fees from Non-ETC-User], 中時電子報 [CHINATIMES]
(Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20140107004296-260401.
41. Id.
42. See Shelley Shan, Toll system passes review’s second week, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb.
21, 2014), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/02/21/2003584026.
43. See 藍悅真 [Lan Yue Zhen], eTag繳錯錢 退費竟要自找車主 遠通恐違個資法
[FEToll Fails to Abide By the PDPA―eTag User Wrongfully Charged by FE-Toll Has to
Deal with the Real User for Fee Reimbursement], 大紀元電子日報 [EPOCHTIMES] (Feb. 26,
2014), http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/14/2/25/n4092102.htm.
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collected the fee from the responsible driver in any manner available
instead of requesting that the customer settle the misconduct caused by
FE-Toll. In this case, FE-Toll should be justified under the PDPA for
using the drivers‘ (both the victim and the person charged) contact
information and/or bank account information to adjust the fee charges
because such data is meant to be used for matters relating to the use of
the ETC system. Regrettably, FE-Toll chose to disclose one driver‘s
personal information, including name, telephone number, and the fact
of his travel on the freeway, and the amount payable, to another driver
and asked them to settle the wrong fee charge themselves.
FE-Toll‘s unauthorized disclosure of personal data is not
permissible under the PDPA and is subject to sanctions and
government audits. Drivers submit their contact information, such as
home and email address, telephone, and credit card information to FEToll when enrolling in the ETC program. The driver‘s name, telephone
number and highway travel records are the ―contact information‖ and
“social activities which may be used to identify a natural person,‖ which
is defined as personal data under the PDPA, 44 and therefore, FE-Toll
shall use such data only in line with the purposes for which the data
were originally obtained, i.e., for FE-Toll to collect toll fees. The law is
clear that personal data may be used only for the purposes for which it
has been collected subject to the following exceptions where:
1. It is in accordance with law; 2. It is to promote the public interest;
3. It is to prevent harm to the data subject‘s life, body, freedom or
property; 4. It is to prevent harm to other persons‘ vital rights and
interests; 5. It is necessary for a government agency or a research
institution to conduct statistical data analysis or academic research,
provided that the data, after being processed by the data provider or
disclosed by the data collector, can no longer be connected with a
person‘s identity; and 6. Written consent has been given by the data
subject.45

44. Article 2 of the PDPA defines Personal Information as:
The terms used herein denote the following meanings: [T]he name, date of
birth, I.D. Card number, passport number, characteristics, fingerprints,
marital status, family, education, occupation, medical record, medical
treatment, genetic information, sexual life, health examination, criminal
record, contact information, financial conditions, social activities and other
information which may be used to identify a natural person, both directly
and indirectly.
Personal Information Protection Act art. 2, ¶ 1 (2010) (Taiwan), available at
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627 (the quoted
language is a translation from Taiwanese to English by the author).
45. Id. at art. 20, ¶ 1 (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to
English by the author).
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Asking the victim of FE-Toll‘s misconduct to settle incorrect
charges that were FE-Toll‘s fault is far outside the toll-collection
purpose. If FE-Toll failed to obtain consent from the driver for data
disclosure, the only possible excuse for FE-Toll to use personal data
outside the original scope is to claim that the processing is to prevent
harm to the vital rights and interests of the driver who was charged the
fees.46 However, the ―other persons‘ vital rights and interests‖ normally
refers to circumstances of life or death and does not seem to be a solid
ground to justify the data misuse in the above scenario. Without any
other grounds to disclose ETC users‘ data, FE-Toll will be held
accountable for its misuse of personal data and thus breaching the
purpose of collection under the PDPA.
2. The Violation of the Security Safeguards Principle
Another ground of PDPA violation arises from FE-Toll‘s failure to
train responsible persons for information handling practices. Clearly,
the FE-Toll personnel, when handling the aforesaid wrongful fee charge
complaint, had no understanding that they must maintain the
confidentiality of ETC personal data.
The PDPA requires data
controllers to adopt proper security measures to prevent personal data
from being stolen, altered, damaged, destroyed or disclosed,47 and the
PDPA Enforcement Rules expressly prescribe that security measures
include ―providing training on data protection issues.‖ 48
3. The Enforcement of the Accountability Principle
The PDPA sets forth enforcement mechanisms for data breaches.
First, the victim of data misuse has recourse against the wrongdoer for
losses incurred.49 The PDPA stipulates that the wrongdoers shall
indemnify the aggrieved data subject for any loss as a result of data
misuse unless the accused can prove that the breach was neither
deliberate nor caused by negligence.50 To lessen the burden of proof for
the data subject, and in view that in a data breach it is normally not
easy to quantify the damage, the law provides that if the actual amount
of damage is not easy to quantify or to prove, the court may order a
46. Id. at art. 20, ¶ 4.
47. ―Non-Government Agencies that handle personal data shall adopt proper
security measures to prevent personal data from being stolen, altered, damaged,
destroyed or disclosed.‖ Id. at art. 27, ¶ 1 (the quoted language is a translation from
Taiwanese to English by the author).
48. Id. at art. 12, ¶ 2 (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to
English by the author).
49. Id. at art. 28-40.
50. Id. at art. 29, ¶ 1 (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to
English by the author).
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damage amount in the range of NT$500 to 20,000 (approximately $17 to
$640 in U.S. dollars) for each violation for each claimant. 51
A class action mechanism is available under the PDPA; twenty or
more individuals who have suffered losses due to the same data breach
incident may grant their litigation rights to a qualified association or
foundation to initiate a class action. For class action claims stemming
from the same incident, the total compensation amount is subject to a
cap of NT$200 million (approximately $6 million U.S. dollars) unless a
higher actual damage amount can be proven.52
In addition to civil liabilities, serious violations such as those
relating to breaching data confidentiality or security to make personal
gains and cause harm to data subjects‘ rights, constitutes a criminal
offence that is subject to a maximum sentence of five years in prison
and/or criminal fines of up to NT$1 million (approximately $33,000 U.S.
dollars).53
Additionally, a data breach may trigger the competent authorities‘
investigation and enforcement actions. If a violation is confirmed by
the competent authority, the data controller could face administrative
fines of up to NT$500,000 (approximately $16,000 U.S. dollars) for each
violation.54 Moreover, depending on the seriousness of the data breach,
the competent authority may order the wrongdoers to cease the illegal
data-handling practices and delete all illegally processed data. 55
In Taiwan, there is no single national data protection authority. A
number of authorities have responsibility for overseeing and enforcing
the PDPA. The Ministry of Justice is the primary sector responsible for
the interpretation of the PDPA and writing regulations. 56 The
enforcement powers of the PDPA are exercised by the respective sector
regulators and city/county government. For FE-Toll‘s violation of the
PDPA, disclosing driver‘s contact information and travel records to a
third party, the PDPA has provided adequate enforcement mechanisms
to hold FE-Toll accountable for its violation of information handling
practices. At the time of writing, however, no enforcement actions have
been brought against FE-Toll.
B. IS ETC GEO-LOCATION DATA PROTECTED BY THE PDPA?
The ETC scenario further involves new privacy challenges
51. Personal Information Protection Act art. 28, ¶ 3, art. 29, ¶ 2.
52. Id. at art. 28, ¶ 4; art. 29, ¶ 2, art. 34 (the quoted language is a translation from
Taiwanese to English by the author).
53. Id. at art. 41-42 (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to
English by the author).
54. Id. at art. 47.
55. Id. at art. 25.
56. See e.g. id. at art. 6, ¶ 2.
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presented by new technologies, particularly regarding issues of geolocation data privacy.57 The central aspect is whether geo-location data
is protected under the PDPA. Under the operation of ETC, FE-Toll
collects geo-location data including drivers‘ travel records, images,
photos, their locations, and movements.58 At first glance, geo-location
data may be non-personal because the data merely indicates the
geographic position of the vehicles that do not directly reveal the
identity of a person. Moreover, the plate number, the date and time of
passing the e-toll gates, and the driving distance of cars might seem to
be information without any personal communication content. However,
technological innovation has made it possible to perform complex data
analysis and transform the traditionally non-content or non-personally
identifiable information into identifiable data.59 The fact that all ETC
users are required to submit personal identifiers along with the vehicle
identifiers to FE-Toll when enrolling in the system has made ETC geolocation data easily linkable to a specific driver. Even for those who do
not voluntarily enroll in the ETC program (some choose not to purchase
an e-Tag but still required to use the ETC system because all manual
collection lanes have been removed), FE-Toll can still identify the
drivers from the automatic license plate reader through the registered
plate number.60
ETC geo-location data can be used to track drivers‘ locations and
movements in real time and indicate a drivers‘ route, locations for
57. See PRESIDENT‘S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, BIG
DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 8 (2014), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_
privacy_-_may_2014.pdf (―Today‘s technologies easily determine an individual‘s current or
prior location. Useful location‐based services include navigation, suggesting better
commuter routes, finding nearby friends, avoiding natural hazards, and advertising the
availability of nearby goods and services. Sighting an individual in a public place can
hardly be a private fact. When big data allows such sightings, or other kinds of passive or
active data collection, to be assembled into the continuous locational track of an
individual‘s private life, however, many Americans [] perceive a potential affront to a
widely accepted ‗reasonable expectation of privacy.‘‖).
58. See 朱致宜 [Zhu Zhi Yi], 個資看透透 徐旭東變「全民公敵」？ [Personal Data Are
Becoming Transparent; Shu-Shu-Dong Is the Enemy of All Citizens?], 財訊 [WEALTH
MAG.], Jan. 15, 2014, http://www.ettoday.net/news/20140115/316568.htm.
59. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1841-45 (2011)
(―Technology is now posing a considerable challenge to the [non- personally identifiable
information] side of the dichotomy. Computer scientists are finding ever more inventive
ways to combine various pieces of [non- personally identifiable information] to make them
[personally identifiable information].‖).
60. See 林浩昇 [Lin Hao Sheng], 每月上2次 不裝eTag行得通 [Using highway without
eTag is workable if you only access highway twice a month], 蘋果日報 [APPLE DAILY] (June
10, 2013),
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/supplement/20130610/35073745/.
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shopping and travel, and other information related to personal
livelihood; meaning such data may be more sensitive than traditional
personal identifiers.61 Therefore, it makes no sense to exclude the ETC
geo-location data from the scope of the PDPA. Geo-location data is the
result of modern technology and was obviously neither considered nor
anticipated when the PDPA was drafted. Fortunately, the definition of
personal data under the PDPA has the flexibility to encompass any
information that can identify an individual regardless of the type of
technology used. Under the PDPA, personal data is defined broadly as
a concept to encompass any sort of information ―which may directly or
indirectly be used to identify… all activities involving processing of
personal data person.‖62 The fact that the ETC geo-location data can
identify a specific person should qualify such data for PDPA protection.
One may argue that when people knowingly expose themselves to
the public, any personal information generated from their public
activities should not be subject to privacy protection. Indeed, the PDPA
recognizes that there are circumstances where the application of the
PDPA would lead to an excessive burden on social activities, and
exceptions are made under Article 51: ―1. When a natural person
collects, processes or uses personal data purely for personal or family
activities; or 2. The image or audio data that are collected, processed or
used in public venues or at public activities and are not combined with
other pieces of personal data.‖ 63 The rationale of the exemption is that
when individuals voluntarily disclose data about themselves, they have
a lesser expectation of privacy, and therefore, it is not necessary to
subject them to data protection laws as long as such data is not
combined with other personal information to identify or that is
identifiable to individuals.64
In the ETC case, it is true that the ETC monitors and cameras on
the freeways, which are undoubtedly public venues, to capture the
drivers‘ movements and locations.65 However, we cannot ignore the fact
that such driver and vehicle image data will be combined with the
61. See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 702-16 (2011).
62. Personal Information Protection Act, art. 2, ¶ 1 (the quoted language is a
translation from Taiwanese to English by the author).
63. Id. at art. 51 (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to English by
the author).
64. See J.Y. Interp. No. 689, at reasoning ¶ 7 (July 29, 2011) (Taiwan), translated in
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/eng/FINT/FINTQRY03.asp?Y1=2011&M1=&D1=&Y2=&M2=&D
2=&cno=&kw=&btnSubmit=Search&sdate=20110000&edate=99991231&keyword=&page
=3&total=35&seq=30.
65. See 林浩昇 [Lin Hao Sheng], 每月上2次 不裝eTag行得通 [Using highway without
eTag is workable if you only access highway twice a month], 蘋果日報 [APPLE DAILY] (June
10, 2013),
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/supplement/20130610/35073745/.
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drivers‘ personal information to identify the specific driver for tollcollection. The reason the ETC system monitors and records the
locations and vehicle movement is to calculate the toll fee and charge
such fees to the driver.66 Therefore, it is difficult to argue that the ETC
geo-location data will not be used in association with the driver‘s
personal identifiers. Thus, a proper interpretation of the PDPA is that
the ETC geo-location data shall not fall under the exceptions of Article
51, and the collection, processing, and use of such data shall follow the
PDPA.
Another reason that the ETC geo-location data shall not be
excluded from privacy protection is that drivers do not have a genuine
choice in accepting ETC surveillance. There is no alternative highway
that offers a non-electronic-toll service. Drivers do not voluntarily
expose themselves to the ETC surveillance and do not have a real
option of refusing surveillance without being deprived of the right to
travel. Driving on roads is not equivalent to a complete forfeiture of
privacy. One may realize that her movements can be seen by other
people in public venues and that there are speed cameras deployed
along the roads to detect and deter speeding and red light runners.
Nonetheless, this expectation is far from being placed in a surveillance
web. If there were a choice, some would certainly choose traditional
tollbooths to avoid being monitored by FE-Toll because they value
privacy more than the benefits of a shorter traveling time. We will
have to consider the imbalance of negotiation powers between FE-Toll
and drivers. If FE-Toll is not prepared to improve its informationhandling practices and establish a comprehensive privacy program,
then drivers‘ privacy cannot be ignored by the PDPA, whose aim is to
offer basic data protection for all activities involving the processing of
personal data as broadly as possible.
In the United States, collecting and using geo-location data is also
causing troubling privacy concerns, and the U.S. Supreme Court‘s
decision in United States v. Jones sheds light on this problem. 67 In
2012, the Court heard a privacy invasion claim stemming from the use
of a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device to monitor the
target driver‘s movements.68 It was highly speculated that the Court
would use this opportunity to clarify whether geo-location data is
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and if so, what level of regulatory
control and privacy protection shall be accorded to such data. However,
the Court avoided this highly debated issue and resolved the claim with
the common law property-based privacy doctrine that ―[t]he

66. Id.
67. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
68. See generally Id.
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Government‘s attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use
of that device to monitor the vehicle‘s movements, constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment‖ because placing a GPS tracking device
on a car is equivalent to trespass.69 Although the privacy question
associated with geo-location data remains unanswered, the Jones
decision provides a favorable ground for ETC drivers‘ privacy protection
as far as geo-location data is concerned. Because the Jones Court has
ruled that the police only invade privacy when installing a GPS device
on the target‘s vehicle, there is no reason to allow FE-Toll to conduct
unregulated surveillance of vehicles with the electronic collection gates
and cameras because these devices are tantamount to a GPS device
attached to each vehicle on the freeway. The privacy invasion by ETC
is even more severe, because Jones relates to specific suspects and is
limited to a certain period, while the ETC functions as an around-theclock surveillance of all the nation‘s drivers. The proportionality
element in ETC is weaker than in Jones because there is no crimesolving reason behind the electronic surveillance, and toll collection
does not seem a justifiable reason to track a driver‘s every movement on
the road, especially for those who do not choose to expose themselves to
the ETC surveillance.
C. CAN FE-TOLL SHARE ETC PERSONAL DATA WITH ITS AFFILIATED
COMPANIES?
Naturally, corporations are trying to maximize the benefit of
personal data by treating personal data as goods for sale, sharing data
with third parties, or using data to analyze and gauge customer
behavior. FE-Toll is no exception. FE-Toll belongs to one of the largest
conglomerates in Taiwan, Far Eastern Group, whose business widely
covers telecommunications, construction, financial services, sea/land
transportation, petrochemicals and energy, hotels, and retail stores. 70
The group has also founded a number of private colleges, universities,
educational institutes, and medical centers.71 In addition to internal use
for toll collection, FE-Toll has incentives to share drivers‘ personal data
with its affiliated companies to pursue lucrative benefits to its entire
group. Moreover, Far Eastern Group‘s far-reaching business is capable
of integrating the overlapping consumer data to generate profiles of
individuals. These profiles include medical and health data, real estate
information, education records, financial data, shopping preferences,

69. Id. at 946.
70. FAR EASTERN GROUP (Taiwan), http://www.feg.com.tw/tw/business/index.aspx
(last visited July 28, 2014).
71. Id.
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and so on.72 For instance, with the assistance of the advanced
information technology and analysis tool developed by the
telecommunication company in the Far Eastern Group, FE-Toll can
monitor and analyze the E-Toll data to evaluate optimal areas for its
affiliated hotel or department store companies to expand new locations.
FE-Toll controls the most up-to-date traffic data and can easily furnish
such data to its affiliated mobile service carrier for them to provide real
time direction or mapping services to their customers, which other
competitors cannot provide. FE-Toll can also supply the E-Toll data for
its affiliated insurance company to decide insurance policy rates. For
example, an insurance company may charge higher insurance rates for
speeding drivers.
FE-Toll can further utilize vehicle location
information for its affiliates to deliver a wide array of services especially
for targeted advertisement. Moreover, Far Eastern Group is actively
expanding its business into China, which presents the primary national
security threat to Taiwan. It gives rise to another concern that the EToll data of millions of Taiwanese citizens will be exposed to data
security risk when the data is transferred outside of Taiwan‘s border.
Inadequate exchanges and processing of data within the same group
further makes drivers‘ personal data more vulnerable.73
As tempting as it may be for FE-Toll to utilize the E-Toll data for
extra benefits besides its toll-collection business, all these desired
secondary uses that are incompatible with the toll-collection purposes
are prohibited under the PDPA without the affected individuals‘ written
consent. The purpose-limitation principle under the PDPA expressly
sets a boundary that personal data can only be used for the purposes
the data was collected for and shall not be reused for other purposes.74
However, there are six statutory conditions for legitimate data reuse:
(1) in accordance with the law; (2) to promote public interest; (3) to
prevent harm to the data subject; (4) to prevent harm to other persons;
(5) for academic research where the data has been made anonymous; or
(6) the affected individual has unambiguously given his written
consent.75 The PDPA does not offer relaxed rules of data sharing for
data controllers and their affiliated companies. FE-Toll‘s desired
sharing of data with its affiliated companies does not seem to fall under
any of the first five criteria. For individuals‘ written consent, the
consent has to be specific written consent made by the data subject
after having been notified by the collector of the new purposes and
72. Id.
73. Business Association Graph, FAR EASTERN GROUP (Taiwan),
http://www.feg.com.tw/tw/business/index.aspx (last visited July 28, 2014) (the quoted
language is a translation from Taiwanese to English by the author).
74. Personal Information Protection Act, art. 20, ¶ 1.
75. Id.
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scope of data use and the consequence of withholding consent.76 The
onus is on the controller to be able to demonstrate that proper consent
has been obtained. Therefore, FE-Toll must obtain written evidence to
demonstrate that it has disclosed the information-sharing practices and
obtained consent from drivers that specifically permits FE-Toll to share
the E-Toll data with its affiliates.
Requiring consent appears promising for privacy protection, but
consent can be tricky to manage, and it is important to consider
whether the consent is valid and freely given. This article has
identified a particular problem in the imbalance of negotiation power
between FE-Toll and drivers because, in the eyes of many drivers, they
are in a subordinate relationship with FE-Toll. If the consent for data
reuse and sharing is bundled with the right to use the highways,
drivers do not have a genuine choice in withholding consent without
suffering prejudices in using the highways. When ETC users click the ‗I
accept‘ button on the consent form, it is unlikely to be valid and freely
given. Although the PDPA does not expressly state that the consent
has to be freely given, a proper appreciation of data protection must
encompass this element.
Moreover, if any of the affiliated companies with whom FE-Toll
wishes to share data are located outside Taiwan, the cross-border flow
of personal data are subject to limitations under the PDPA. The PDPA
recognizes that the transfer of personal data to other countries requires
special consideration and empowers the competent authority to restrict
the international transfer under situations where:
1. It will prejudice any material national interest; 2. It is prohibited or
restricted under an international treaty or agreement; 3. The country
to which the personal data are to be transmitted does not have sound
legal protection of personal data, thereby affecting the rights or
interest of the data subjects; or 4. The purpose of transmitting
personal data is to evade restrictions prescribed under the PDPA.77

Like FE-Toll, many Taiwanese companies transfer personal data
cross-border to their regional hub that hosts data processing facilities.
One of the common data export destinations is China. At the time of
76. The consent requirement, as it appears in the PDPA, is as follows:
The written consent mentioned in Item 7 of Article 16 and Item 6 of
Paragraph 1 of Article 20 means a specific written consent made by the data
subject after having been notified by the collector of the new purposes and
scope of data use and the consequence to withhold the consent.
Id. at art. 7, ¶ 2 (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to English by the
author).
77. Id. at art. 21 (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to English by
the author).
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writing China is still developing its national data protection laws, and it
is unclear whether China can offer an adequate level of privacy
protection as the recipient of data transferred from overseas. If China
cannot offer adequate privacy protection, the Taiwanese government
may ban such international transfers.
D. CAN FE-TOLL SUPPLY ETC PERSONAL DATA TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR
PUBLIC INTEREST?
1. How to Interpret the Public Interest Clause of the PDPA
The limitless opportunities afforded by online business and
advanced technologies have inspired companies to utilize the gold mine
of personal data as much as they can. In the meantime, such
comprehensive records of citizens are becoming important resources for
many government agencies to achieve their objectives, and there are an
increasing number of occasions where government agencies are
expressing interest in gaining access to the databases maintained by
companies for reasons of national security, criminal investigation and
prevention, or disease prevention or treatment. 78 How companies
respond to requests from the government to access their own personal
database is a dilemma between sustaining consumer trust in business
and resisting pressure from the government. On the other hand, some
businesses are offering to sell consumers‘ personal data for profit. FEToll is one of them. News reports revealed that on two occasions FEToll, before the inauguration of the ETC system had already made sales
pitches to Taiwan‘s national criminal investigation agency, the
Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB), offering to sell the E-Toll data.79
The CIB also once sought access to the ETC database for reasons of
crime prevention.80 The questions that arise are: Does the CIB have
any legal grounds to obtain the E-Toll data from FE-Toll? Can FE-Toll
refuse CIB access? Does the PDPA permit FE-Toll to sell E-Toll data?
All these questions are associated with a problematic rule under the
PDPA that allows companies and the government to be exempted from
78. See PRESIDENT‘S COUNCIL, supra note 57, at 5-6 (―Current rules may allow
government to purchase or otherwise obtain data from the private sector that, in some
cases, it could not legally collect itself, or to outsource to the private sector analyses it
could not itself legally perform. The possibility of government exercising, without proper
safeguards, its own monopoly powers and also having unfettered access to the private
information marketplace is unsettling.‖) (footnotes omitted).
79. See 林志青 [Lin Zhi Qing], 遠通2次報價憂個資法打住 刑事局持續協調 [PDPA
Concerns Halted FE-Toll Two Offers to CIB, Negotiation Continues], 蘋果日報 [APPLE
DAILY] (Jan. 11, 2014),
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20140111/324266/.
80. Id.
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some data protection principles if public interest is involved.81
Although FE-Toll is prohibited under the purpose limitation
principle of the PDPA to sell FE-Toll data to the CIB outside the
original data collection purpose,82 it is arguable whether FE-Toll claims
that the sale of data is for the public interest because such information
is helpful for the CIB to investigate crimes and preserve public safety.
This likely assertion is based on Article 20, Paragraph 1 of the PDPA,
which states that personal data may be used only for the purposes for
which it has been collected unless ―1. it is in accordance with law; 2. it
is to promote the public interest. . . .‖83 Currently, there is no clear
interpretation or guidance as to what types of tasks meet the public
interest condition.
There are a number of reasons the ―public interest‖ condition under
the PDPA should be interpreted strictly and only apply to very limited
situations. The primary reason is that private sectors collect and use
personal data to pursue their own business benefits and not the public
interest. Therefore, public interest will be narrowly applied to exempt
data collectors from their data protection obligations. For the public
sector, it is their responsibility to perform tasks in the public interest
and such activities are often in conflict with individual privacy. We
therefore need a rule to decide under what circumstances public
interests shall prevail over personal privacy. However, businesses
generally have no official authority or power and are not burdened with
public tasks. If private entities are not obtaining personal data for the
public interest, it is illogical to allow the private sector to assert public
interest as a legitimate ground to use personal data in violation of the
data subject‘s will. In regard to choosing between business interests
and the public interest, the former is naturally the first priority for
private sectors. If the public interest clause is applied broadly at the
collector‘s discretion, it is difficult to expect that businesses will protect
the interests of the data subject when the businesses are lured by
potential gain brought by reusing this data. It is no different to open a
door for the private sector to use personal data without restrictions in

81. Personal Information Protection Act art. 20, ¶ 1 (2010) (Taiwan), available at
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627.
82.
―The rights and interests of the data subject should be respected in collecting,
processing or using personal information and the information should be handled in
accordance with the principle of bona fide. It should not go beyond the purpose of
collection and should be reasonable and fair.‖
Personal Information Protection Act art. 5 (the quoted language is a translation from
Taiwanese to English by the author).
83. Id. at art. 20, ¶ 1 (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to
English by the author).
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allowing private sectors to process personal data for a purpose that is
irrelevant and even opposite the originally specified purposes. Absent
clarification of specific factors regarding when and how public interest
may justify the breach of personal privacy, this exemption is prone to
abuse by data controllers bypassing the obligation to safeguard privacy
and breach the promise of personal data protection under the umbrella
of public interest.
The theme of the PDPA is to seek a balance between the interest of
the data controller in using personal data and the privacy of individuals
in keeping the data private. The PDPA imposes the condition that
collection, processing, and the use of personal data by the private sector
is lawful when it is done with the permissible criteria listed in the
PDPA.84 For certain situations, lawmakers acknowledge that the
likelihood of harming privacy is minimal, as in the case where data is
obtained from public resources or the data is used as part of a
contractual relationship, therefore allowing companies to collect,
process, or use personal data with easy-to-meet conditions.85 In other
circumstances, where lawmakers recognize that, although there may be
potentially negative impacts to privacy, there are greater interests in
safeguarding the collection, processing, or use of personal data. In these
outlined exemptions, the benefits of the collection and processing of
personal data preempts privacy rights.
The PDPA provides an
exhaustive list containing six clauses that outline these situations:
Personal data may be used only for the purposes for which it has been
collected subject to the following exceptions where: 1. it is in
accordance with law; 2. it is to promote the public interest; 3. it is to
prevent harm to the data subject‘s life, body, freedom or property; 4. it
is to prevent harm to other persons‘ vital rights and interests; 5. it is
necessary for a government agency or a research institution to conduct
statistical data analysis or academic research, provided that the data,
after been processed by data provider or disclosed by data collector,
can no longer connect with a person‘s identity; and 6. written consent
has been given by the data subject.86

For the ―public interest‖ clause, the PDPA is not intended to grant
a broad authorization for companies to freely collect, process, or use
personal data under the banner of public interest. If public interest is
broadly interpreted, all other requirements in the exhaustive list that
were designed to impose limits on data controllers‘ information
gathering would become useless. A sensible approach to adequately
apply these clauses is that if any of the other five clauses fit the specific
84. Id. at art. 19, ¶ 1.
85. Id.
86. Id. at art. 20, ¶ 1 (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to
English by the author).
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situations, they should apply in priority to public interest. Moreover,
when public interest is the only applicable situation, the clause should
take into consideration the particular interests of the affected data
subjects and the benefits of using the subjects‘ data. When the value of
subject data is greater, the public interest should be significant enough
to justify the breaching of an individual‘s privacy rights.
2. Does FE-Toll Need to Inform Drivers When Supplying E-Toll data to
the Government?
Assuming, in an extreme situation, that FE-Toll can disclose the
data to other parties in the public interest, a sound protection to
personal privacy is that the affected individuals shall be properly
informed of such disclosure and have the opportunity to dispute the
disclosure. Unfortunately, the PDPA does not expressly require the
data controller to give the data subject further notice when data is
reused under the statutory exceptions.87 When the data controller uses
the data outside the scope of the original purpose, the data subject may
not even know his personal information has been shared with others.
Under the current PDPA, the notification obligations are applicable
only when data is first collected.88 The PDPA stipulates that ―a
government agency or a non-government entity, when collecting
personal data from the data subject pursuant to Article 15 or Article 19,
must unambiguously notify the data subject the following information:
‗1. Name of the government agency or non-government entity, 2. The
purpose of data processing . . . .‘‖89 Article 9 goes on to say:
A government agency or a non-government entity, when collecting
personal data pursuant to Article 15 or Article 19 but the data are not
obtained directly from the data subject, must notify the data subject of
the source of their personal data and the information contained in
Clause 1 to Clause 5 of Paragraph of the preceding Article, before it
process or uses such data.90

It is important to note that the most important purposes of the
PDPA is to ensure fair and transparent processing and to empower
individuals to require full and accurate information of the collection and
use of data. This article proposes that a consistent implementation of
the fair and transparent principle is that, even for statutory exceptions
for the use of data, for another reason without the data subject‘s
consent and outside the scope of the original consent, the statutory
87. Id. at art. 20.
88. Personal Information Protection Act art. 8-9.
89. Personal Information Protection Act, art. 8, ¶ 1.
90. Id. at art. 9, ¶ 1 (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to
English by the author).
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reason shall be a new and separate data collection activity by the party
who obtains such data. The original data holders shall still be held
accountable for the notification requirements to communicate the new
data collection activity to the affected individuals.
E. CAN GOVERNMENT REQUEST FE-TOLL TO SUPPLY E-TOLL DATA?
1. The Scenario of the ETC Privacy Issue
What would be the legal complications when the CIB requests that
FE-Toll supply E-Toll data? Must FE-Toll comply with the CIB‘s
request? The first source of law the CIB relies on is the Communication
Security and Surveillance Act (CSSA), which authorizes the
government‘s surveillance of electronic communications in the process
of criminal investigation through electronic devices.91 In Taiwan, the
CSSA is commonly used by law enforcement to conduct electronic
surveillance or obtain wiretaps in investigating suspects or criminal
defendants.92 The E-Toll data is collected and transmitted to and from
the ETC electronic system and may be included within the scope of the
CSSA, as said law defines communications as ―1. symbols, texts,
images, sound or other wired or wireless telecommunications that are
sent, stored, transmitted or received via telecommunication
equipment.‖93 Article 5, Paragraph 1 of CSSA stipulates that:
If there are sufficient facts indicating that the accused or suspects
have committed the following listed criminal offenses that seriously
[in]danger national security, economic stability or society orders, and
there are sufficient reasons to believe that the communication records
are relevant to the subject investigation and such records cannot or
are difficult to be obtained from other resources, an electronicsurveillance approval letter will be issued.94

An electronic-surveillance approval letter shall be approved by the
court before conducting any type of surveillance in order to protect
individuals‘ interests.95 The CIB claims to access the E-Toll data for the
―prevention of crime,‖ which means no crime has been or is about to be
committed at the time the request is made. Because there are no
91. Comm. Sec. and Surveillance Act, art. 5, ¶ 1 (2014) (Taiwan), translated in
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL012821.
92. See Chih-Jen Hsueh, Criminal Penalties for GPS Tracking: A Case Study on
Taiwan High Court Judgment No. 100-Shangyi-Tzi-2407, 11 TECH. L. REV. 119, 133-36
(2014).
93. Id. at art. 3, ¶ 1 (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to
English by the author).
94. Id. at art. 5, ¶ 1 (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to
English by the author).
95. Id. at art. 5, ¶ 2.
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identified suspects or defendants at the time the CIB requested the EToll data, the legitimate criterion of Article 5 of the CSSA has not been
met. Accordingly, if the CIB fails to substantiate that the data request
is related to a specific criminal investigation activity, it does not have
statutory grounds under the CSSA to access E-Toll data, and FE-Toll
may refuse the CIB‘s data requests.
Strategically, the CIB has an alternative to obtain the E-Toll data
by relying on another source of law by alleging that the E-Toll data
constitutes non-content communications, which can be accessed without
a court approved electronic-surveillance letter.96
For personal
information such as dialed phone numbers, email addresses, and
similar information unrelated to the content, the Taiwanese
government agencies often rely on a relatively lenient legal standard of
the Telecommunications Act. The Telecommunications Act states that
the provider of wire or electronic communications services or cable and
internet services shall take all necessary steps to preserve records in
secrecy unless the disclosure of such records is made in accordance with
the applicable laws and regulations.97 However, a separate regulation
promulgated under said Act requires these telecommunication service
operators provide government access to the records in their
possession.98 The regulation adopts a relatively easy-to-meet standard
that only requires the applicant agency to state the necessity,
reasonableness, and proportionality when requesting the records. 99
However, no detailed requirements are provided, and the regulation
does not even require the applicant agency to provide specific and
articulable facts about the intended purpose of the data access. The
vagueness of the language of the regulation is often misused by
government agencies to obtain individuals‘ private contact information
from telecommunications firms.100 The Telecommunications Act has
96. See 吳景欽 [Wu Jing Qin], 非關犯罪之通聯紀錄調取之疑義 [Issues of Accessing to
Personal Communication Records for Purposes Not Related to Criminal Investigation], 今
日新聞網 [NOWNEWS.COM] (Jan. 24, 2014),
http://www.ettoday.net/news/20140121/318115.htm.
97. Telecomm. Act, art. 7, ¶ 1 (2013) (Taiwan), available at
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL012763.
98. Id. at art. 7, ¶ 1-2.
99. Reg. for Handling Requests from Competent Authorities for Comm. Rec., art. 3,
¶ 1 (2002) (Taiwan), available at
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Law/LawSearchResult.aspx?p=A&k1=%E9%9B%BB%E4%BF%A1%
E4%BA%8B%E6%A5%AD%E8%99%95%E7%90%86%E6%9C%89%E9%97%9C%E6%A9%
9F%E9%97%9C%E6%9F%A5%E8%A9%A2%E9%9B%BB%E4%BF%A1%E9%80%9A%E4
%BF%A1%E7%B4%80%E9%8C%84%E5%AF%A6%E6%96%BD%E8%BE%A6%E6%B3%9
5&t=E1F1A1&TPage=1.
100. See 吳景欽 [Wu Jing Qin], 非關犯罪之通聯紀錄調取之疑義 [Issues of Accessing to
Personal Communication Records for Non-Criminal-Investigation Purposes], 今日新聞網
[NOWNEWS.COM] (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.ettoday.net/news/20140121/318115.htm; see
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been criticized for having loopholes that allow public sectors to conduct
unreasonable surveillance.101
The insufficiency and past injustices of data protection under the
Telecommunications Act can now be remedied under the PDPA since
said Act took effect on October 1, 2012. The PDPA has provided
minimum data protection requirements for all personal data, and
therefore, if the CIB or other government agencies wish to gain access
to the E-Toll data, they must comply with the PDPA. Under the PDPA,
a public entity must have a legitimate purpose and have at least one of
the following criteria to lawfully collect personal data: ―1. It is necessary
in the exercise of the official authority vested in the controller; 2. A
written consent has been given by the data subject; or 3. The rights and
interests of the data subject will not be jeopardized.‖102
The CIB alleged that it is exercising its official duty to obtain EToll data.103 Indeed, engaging in criminal investigation is among the
official powers of the CIB. However, whether there is a close and
substantial connection between the bulk collection of E-Toll data and
prevention of crime is doubtful. The requirement for necessity is an
essential limiting factor to narrow government interference with
private interests and is essential for judicial review.
A prior dispute regarding the Taiwanese government‘s desired plan
to establish a national fingerprint database may shed light on the
conflict between information privacy and the government‘s duty. The
Taiwan Constitutional Court ruled a clause of the Household
Registration Act requiring citizens to submit their fingerprints when
applying for a national identification card is unconstitutional.104
Similar to the CIB‘s contention of its intended bulk data collection for
crime prevention, the rationale behind the fingerprints legislation is to
also林鈺雄 [Lin Yu Xiong], 濫調通聯紀錄何時了？ [Time to Cease Abusive Access to
Personal Communication Records], 自由電子報 [LIBERTY TIMES] (Jan. 13, 2014),
http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2014/new/jan/13/today-republic2.htm.
101. See 吳景欽 [Wu Jing Qin], 非關犯罪之通聯紀錄調取之疑義 [Issues of Accessing to
Personal Communication Records for Purposes Not Related to Criminal Investigation], 今
日新聞網 [NOWNEWS.COM] (Jan. 24, 2014),
http://www.ettoday.net/news/20140121/318115.htm.
102. Personal Information Protection Act, art. 15 (2010) (Taiwan), available at
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627 (the quoted
language is a translation from Taiwanese to English by the author).
103. See 葉志堅 [Ye Zhi Jian], ETC成監控系統？！ 警政署發文監控全民 [ETC Turns
to Be a Surveillance System?! The Criminal Investigation Bureau Sent Notice to Monitor
All Citizen], 今日新聞 [NOWNEWS] (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.nownews.com/n/2014/01/10/1085265.
104. J.Y. Interp. No. 603, at holding ¶ 1 (Sept. 28, 2005) (Taiwan), translated in
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/eng/FINT/FINTQRY03.asp?Y1=2004&M1=&D1=&Y2=&M2=&D
2=&cno=&kw=&btnSubmit=Search&sdate=20040000&edate=99991231&keyword=&page
=12&total=148&seq=116.
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create a national fingerprint database that will undoubtedly benefit
criminal detection and investigation. The goal may sound promising,
but such a proposition suggests that all citizens are potential criminals,
and therefore, it will be helpful to establish a nationwide fingerprint
system to identify criminal offenders. Supporters of such legislature
fail to note that there is an imbalance between the interest of the
government in gathering fingerprints and interest of all citizens who
are required to give up their information privacy for vague and openended objectives. It is also left unexplained whether fingerprint
gathering is necessary and is the only method to achieve the desired
end. For example, fingerprints found at the crime scene do not
necessarily prove that the fingerprint owner is the person who
committed the crime. For these reasons, the Taiwan Constitutional
Court ruled that the household agency‘s bulk collection of all of
Taiwan‘s citizens‘ fingerprints violates the principle of proportionality
and is unconstitutional and must be ended.105
For the ETC situation, if the reason the government seeks the EToll data is to facilitate crime prevention, this reasoning is based on the
same hypothesis that all vehicle users are potential criminals, and thus,
obtaining E-Toll data can benefit crime prevention. However, without
proper justification that the E-Toll data are necessary to fulfill the
stated objectives, or that all other options have been exhausted and
there is no other way to achieve the same purpose, the CIB‘s request to
access the ETC database for general crime prevention (i.e., not for a
particular investigation of criminal case) is not in line with the principle
of proportionality. FE-Toll should reject such requests pursuant to
Article 5 of the PDPA.106
Moreover, if a broad crime prevention purpose cannot justify the
government‘s invasion of personal privacy, there is no reason to allow
private sectors, such as FE-Toll, to sell E-Toll data to the CIB for the
claimed crime prevention reason. This supports the above assertion
that the public interest exception for private entities to use personal
data for other reasons should be interpreted strictly and only apply to
very limited situations.
2. A Comparative Law Perspective from United States Supreme Court
Decisions
In the United States, geo-location data is also raising troubling
privacy invasion concerns. In the 2012 case of the United States v.
Jones, the Supreme Court faced privacy challenges presented by new
devices when police placed a global positioning system (GPS) device on
105. Id.
106. Personal Information Protection Act art. 5.
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a car to track the target‘s whereabouts for twenty-eight days.107 Public
activities and personal information a person puts into the hands of
others are generally not protected under the U.S. Fourth
Amendment.108 However, new technologies such as GPS location
identification function has blurred the line of ―public‖ and ―third party‖
elements because one may realize that his movements can be seen by
other people in public venues, but his expectation is far from being put
into a surveillance web and having every movement on the road
recorded.109 Surveillance in public and access to records held by third
parties are new technology privacy concerns that call for new
constitutional rules. Unfortunately, no good answer has been provided
yet. As a comparative perspective, it is worth exploring the privacy
issues concerning geo-location data under the Fourth Amendment. If
the U.S. has a highway surveillance program similar to ETC, it is
unclear whether the government is permitted to conduct a warrantless
search by requesting that the ETC operator turn over the customer‘s
geo-location data.
This article highlights the privacy doctrines
previously ruled on by the U.S. Supreme Court and examines whether
they are still adequate to respond to new privacy threats posed by new
technologies.
a. Privacy Protection Doctrines under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.110

The Supreme Court initially interpreted the Fourth Amendment
such that to constitute an unreasonable search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment, there had to be physical trespass into private
spaces (trespass doctrine).111 The physical trespass requirement was

107. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
108. See David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 62, 83-86 (2013).
109. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
111. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (―The reasonable view is
that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends
to project his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house and
messages while passing over them are not within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.‖).
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later abandoned in Katz v. United States,112 in which the Court held
that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. However, what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.113

In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan set out both the
subjective and objective requirements under the Fourth Amendment: ―a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy‖ and
―the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‗reasonable.‘‖114 This twofold test laid out the foundation of the widely
cited reasonable expectation of privacy test and formed the major
consideration when the Court determined the Fourth Amendment claim
(reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine). In the time since, the
Fourth Amendment protection is no longer limited to physical trespass.
In later decisions when applying the reasonable expectation of
privacy test, the Court further formulated another prominent test, the
―third-party doctrine,‖ which states, ―a person has no expectation of
privacy in communications voluntarily provided to a third party.‖ 115 In
United States v. Miller, the Court held that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the

112. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (holding that ―[t]he
Government‘s eavesdropping activities violated the privacy upon which petitioner
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‗search and
seizure‘ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment‖ and ―[b]ecause the Fourth
Amendment protects people rather than places, its reach cannot turn on the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.‖).
113. Id. at 351.
114. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (―As the Court‘s opinion states, ‗the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.‘ The question, however, is what protection it
affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference
to a ‗place.‘ My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‗reasonable.‘ Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he
expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‗plain view‘ of
outsiders are not ‗protected‘ because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against
being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be
unreasonable.‖).
115. See Allyson Haynes, Virtual Blinds: Finding Online Privacy in Offline
Precedents, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 603, 622 (2011).
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confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.116

Under the third-party doctrine, one has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in any information that has become known to a third party. 117
The Supreme Court has upheld the third-party doctrine in Smith v.
Maryland, where the phone numbers a person called were not protected
by the Fourth Amendment because the phone company had access to
the phone number (reaffirming the third-party doctrine) and because
phone numbers are not phone communication content. 118
Despite the above development when the standards of reasonable
expectation of privacy were starting to mature, the Court brought back
the trespass doctrine, which was decided inadequate in Katz. In Kyllo
v. United States, the majority opinion written by Justice Scalia cited the
trespass doctrine to emphasize the privileged position of the home. 119
Justice Scalia again wrote for the majority in United States v. Jones and
reaffirmed the position in Kyllo that physical intrusion over a property
right shall be the leading point to determine Fourth Amendment
violation.120 The Jones Court held that ―[t]he Government‘s attachment
of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor
the vehicle‘s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment‖ because a GPS tracking device on a car is an act
equivalent to trespass.121 In Jones, Justice Scalia claimed two types of
Fourth Amendment rights. The first was the property right to protect
freedom from arbitrary invasions, which was the common law basis in
Kyllo and is commonly known as the property-based approach.122 The
second is the reasonable expectation of privacy, which was the common
law basis in Katz and is commonly known as the privacy-based
116. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
117. Gray & Citron, supra note 108, at 86 (―[T]he Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment cannot save us from ‗misplaced confidence‘ in third parties. Even if we avoid
public exposure by only sharing our private activities with a select few, we run the risk
that those people will violate our trust by sharing the details with law enforcement.‖)
(footnote omitted).
118. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
119. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (―Where, as here, the Government
uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
Fourth Amendment ‗search,‘ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.‖).
120. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (2012) (―The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its
close connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to ―the right of
the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures‖; the phrase ―in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects‖ would have been superfluous. Consistent with this
understanding, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass,
at least until the latter half of the 20th century.‖) (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 946.
122. See Devin W. Ness, Information Overload: Why Omnipresent Technology and the
Rise of Big Data Shouldn’t Spell the End for Privacy as We Know It, 31 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 925, 939-41 (2012).
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approach, applicable in non-physical-invasive monitoring.123 The Jones
Court was silent as to whether the traditional third-party doctrine and
public observation test exceptions are still suited to the digital age and
did not reveal in its opinion how to treat privacy impacts brought by
new surveillance technologies such as GPS. 124 Justices Sotomayor
criticized, in her concurring opinion, that ―[in] cases of electronic or
other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical
invasion on property, the majority opinion‘s trespassory test may
provide little guidance.‖125 Although the Jones Court‘s adoption of the
conventional property-based approach to adjudicate the new type
technology invasion claim was controversial, it is certain that Jones still
affirmed Katz in the sense that the reasonable expectation of privacy
test shall be the leading standard to adjudge the legitimacy of the
government‘s information-gathering, if regarded as non-physicalinvasive monitoring.
b. Are the Fourth Amendment Doctrines still Adequate in the Modern
Technology Era?
Questions have been raised regarding how to apply the classic
reasonable expectation of privacy test to disputes caused by emerging
technologies126 because applying a socially recognizable standard of
123. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (2012) (―For unlike the concurrence, which would make
Katz the exclusive test, we do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving
merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to
Katz analysis.‖) (citation omitted).
124. Regarding the criticism of the majority‘s property-based approach, see Id. at
961-62 (Alito J., concurring).
125. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor J., concurring).
126. See Orin Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending it, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1201-12 (2003) (Professor
Orin S. Kerr indicated that there are three reasons ―why it may be difficult under current
doctrine for the Fourth Amendment to offer strong privacy protections online.‖ ―The first
reason is the uncertainty over whether and when Internet users can retain a ‗reasonable
expectation of privacy‘ in information sent to network providers, including stored e-mails.‖
The second reason is the Internet makes the Fourth Amendment rules governing grand
jury subpoenas weak. According to the third party doctrine, ―so long as the third party is
in possession of the target‘s materials, the government may subpoena the materials from
the third party without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.‖ Therefore, the
Government can compel the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to disclose the information
to them without the restriction of Fourth Amendment rules ―[b]ecause ISPs are thirdparty corporate entities.‖ ―The third reason that the Fourth Amendment generally offers
weak privacy protections online is that most ISPs are private actors. Most are commercial
service providers, not government entities. Under the private search doctrine, the Fourth
Amendment ‗is wholly inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one,
effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the
participation or knowledge of any governmental official.‘‖); see also Russell L. Weaver,
Privacy in an Age of Advancing Technology, 82 MISS. L.J. 975, 992-93 (2013).
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reasonable expectation to determine the legitimacy of using new
tracking technology is likely to undermine privacy protection. Private
information has become more easily accessible by others due to
emerging technologies without the data subject‘s voluntary disclosure.
We can depict the dilemma in applying the traditional privacy
expectation standard to GPS surveillance as follows: According to Katz
and Jones, to argue for a reasonable expectation of privacy, a person
must meet a twofold requirement―a person has exhibited his subjective
expectation of privacy and such expectation has to be socially
recognizable. If, in the future, society forms a consensus that GPS‘s
main function is to provide a geographic direction service and therefore
can be easily used to track the GPS user‘s location, the objective privacy
standard could be interpreted in the manner that one has less
expectation of privacy when using GPS devices. Some favoring this
position might add that stalking by machine does not present greater
invasion to one‘s privacy because GPS surveillance only electronically
monitors the vehicle, not directly watch the movements of the targeted
person, and what is being watched through GPS surveillance is the
car‘s movement, not the human being. However, can this argument
(i.e., the GPS tracing device is less invasive than a stalker) hold true in
other situations where other variables are involved? For instance, if the
GPS device is used by the police to monitor the suspect‘s whereabouts
for an entire month, compared to the situation where the police deploy a
team of investigators to follow a suspect for just one day, which scenario
poses a more severe privacy threat? The line does not seem to be
clear.127 It would be very difficult for one to invoke their Fourth
Amendment right if their claimed expectation of privacy is not
supported by the society‘s norms and standards.
(1) Problematic Third-Party Doctrine for Digital Privacy
The Court in Miller originally established the third-party doctrine
to supplement the ―reasonable expectation of privacy test‖ in Katz. The
principle is that a person generally has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in private information, but if a person puts the information into
the hands of someone else, the person‘s privacy interest is not protected
by the Fourth Amendment because we know of the risk that a ―third
party‖ will share the information with others. 128 As soon as the
information is uploaded to the Internet, the individual must necessarily
anticipate that the personal information will become generally visible to
others, and thus, the third party doctrine will render the data ineligible

127. See Gray & Citron, supra note 108, at 83-100.
128. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 435-36 (1976).
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for Fourth Amendment protection.129 The result of applying the thirdparty doctrine is problematic because one‘s posted activities on online
social networks are not treated as information with a reasonable
expectation of privacy even if the account is set only for friends due to
the application of the third-party doctrine.130
The third-party doctrine faces challenges in regard to information
privacy issues arising from the use of modern technologies such as email, whether this doctrine is adequate to apply to e-mails remains to
be tested in courts. A notable opinion by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals‘ has revised the third-party doctrine held by the Supreme
Court. In the United States v. Warshak, an e-mail user argued that
―the government‘s warrantless, ex parte seizure of approximately
27,000 of his private emails constituted a violation of the Fourth
Amendment‘s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.‖ 131
The Sixth Circuit court held that the e-mails stored by e-mail service
providers are protected by the Fourth Amendment; the government
needs a search warrant based on probable cause to seize e-mail
messages.132 However, the court wrote an arguable sentence that may
open the door for e-mail service providers to lessen their data protection
obligation: ―if the ISP expresses an intention to audit, inspect, and
monitor its subscriber‘s emails, that might be enough to render an
129. See Haynes, supra note 115, at 628-29 (indicating that in the online context, if
we apply the law strictly, ―there is by definition no right of privacy on the Internet, either
because it is seen as ‗public‘ and not ‗private,‘ or because communicating via the Internet
necessitates sharing with a third party.‖).
130. See Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)
(―Indeed, as neither Facebook nor MySpace guarantee complete privacy, Plaintiff has no
legitimate reasonable expectation of privacy. In this regard, MySpace warns users not to
forget that their profiles and MySpace forums are public spaces, and Facebook‘s privacy
policy set forth, inter alia, that ‗[y]ou post User Content . . . . on the Site at your own risk.
Although we allow you to set privacy options that limit access to your pages, please be
aware that no security measures are perfect or impenetrable.‘ Thus, when Plaintiff
created her Facebook and MySpace accounts, she consented to the fact that her personal
information would be shared with others, notwithstanding her privacy settings. Indeed,
that is the very nature and purpose of these social networking sites else they would cease
to exist. Since Plaintiff knew that her information may become publicly available, she
cannot now claim that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy. As recently set forth
by commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, given the millions of
users, ‗[i]n this environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations,
but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.‘‖) (citation
omitted); but see Haynes, supra note 115, at 645 (Professor Allyson W. Haynes criticized
the court decision and indicated that ―[t]he court failed to give any weight to the plaintiffs
affirmative action in restricting her disclosures via hei privacy settings. To the court,
disclosure on an OSN was equivalent to public disclosure, regardless of her efforts to limit
her audience. This traditional view of privacy as secrecy fails to recognize any right to
control the extent of that disclosure.‖) (footnote omitted).
131. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282 (6th Cir. 2010).
132. Id. at 274.
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expectation of privacy unreasonable.‖133
In addition to Warshak, a number of email users have taken the
initiative to challenge email service providers‘ scanning their emails.
The Internet giant and email service provider, Google, is being sued for
violation of privacy by scanning the contents of Gmail messages in
order to capture information about its users and to send
advertisements.134 This case is in its preliminary stages and it might be
too soon to tell how the court will rule on the dispute. Nevertheless, if
the presiding judge decides to allow for a potential class-action suit
against Google and rejects Google‘s arguments that users have no
expectation that their e-mail communications will not be read by e-mail
service providers,135 the court may have signaled that the third-party
doctrine presented in Miller in an offline world needs to be
reconsidered. It is worth noting that when Google argued that all
Gmail users must expect that their e-mails will be subject to automated
processing, the court noted that Google‘s privacy policy did not specify
whether Google is scanning the content of the e-mails.136 However,
even if Google‘s Gmail privacy policy expressly stated that it monitors
subscriber‘s e-mail content, which Warshak notes as an exception to the
reasonable expectation doctrine, is it reasonable to jump to the
conclusion that Gmail users would no longer have any reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding their private e-mail communications?
The time has come to reexamine the third-party doctrine in the digital
age.
To many email users, the role of an e-mail service provider is no
different from that of the post office in helping to deliver private
communications, irrespective of whether the form of transmission is in
print or online. In the offline world, when one mails a letter to a friend,
by applying the Miller test, it seems reasonable that one cannot claim a
reasonable privacy expectation in a letter because one should perceive
the risk of the letter being disclosed to the public as soon as the letter is
out of the sender‘s control. It should be noted that even when applying
the third-party doctrine, the third party is the intended addressee of the
letter. The third-party doctrine does not imply exemption of the post
office from the obligation to respect the sender‘s privacy and to protect
the letter from prying. The post office should not be the third party

133. Id. at 287.
134. See Hayley Tsukayama, Judge Allows Lawsuit against Google’s Gmail Scans to
Move Forward, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/judge-allows-lawsuit-againstgoogles-gmail-scans-to-move-forward/2013/09/26/3b4bedaa-26e4-11e3-b75d5b7f66349852_story.html.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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under the privacy exception.
Unlike the post office, e-mail service providers may claim to be the
third party under the Miller test. Post office or mail carriers do not
need (and are not allowed) to open a sealed envelope in the course of
delivery, whereas electronic e-mails will be subject to automated
processing by ISPs and email providers. For e-mails, not only can the
receiver read the message, but every word in the e-mail is also open and
visible to email operators and others who have access to the system,
even if the contemplated receiver does not open the e-mail at all. If email users must expect that their e-mails will be read by the service
provider because this is how electronic mail techniques work, e-mail
service providers may claim to be a third party under the third-party
test. However, is society prepared to recognize that private e-mail
messages are not subject to Fourth Amendment protection by applying
the third-party test?
The above discussion underscores the fact that the earlier adopted
―reasonable expectation of privacy test‖ does not respond well to the
privacy invasion concerns arising from new information technologies,
and failure to modernize the non-digital world standard to adapt to
technology changes will threaten privacy protection. The “objective
reasonable expectation standard‖ is intended to examine whether
society is prepared to recognize the privacy expectation as reasonable.
Technological progress can affect society‘s expectation of information
privacy and shift the line of this objective standard. When private
information becomes more easily accessible by others due to increasing
use of modern technologies, it also becomes more difficult for the data
subject to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the piece of
personal information.137
(2) New Technology Blurs the Line between Content and Non-content
Information: Phone Numbers vs. IP Addresses
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that the phone
numbers a person called were not protected by the Fourth Amendment,
partly in because the phone numbers were not phone communication
content.138 Some call this the ―content-envelope distinction‖ standard. 139
The content information is the letter itself and the envelope information
is the address.140 According to this standard, the Fourth Amendment
does not protect phone numbers dialed or the addresses of letters sent
137. See Weaver, supra note 126.
138. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
139. See DANIEL J SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 157 (2011).
140. Id.
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because envelope information is less sensitive than content
information.141 Similar to telephone numbers, which are used by
telephone companies to complete the call, an IP address is a set of
numbers assigned to every computer when users log onto the
Internet.142 By applying this test, an IP address is necessary for ISPs to
complete the service and does not involve the merits of communication,
so an IP address does not seem to be protected by the Fourth
Amendment.143 Some have questioned whether IP addresses are just
numbers without any content. IP addresses have distinguishable
features that phone numbers do not have―an IP address can show a
map of how a person surfs the Internet.144 When an IP address can
indicate a person‘s surfing activities on the Internet, leading to
disclosure of the subject‘s consumption habits, health condition and
personal interests, whether the content/envelope distinction test still
applies needs to be considered.
Phone contacts, the length of a telephone conversation, and where
the phone conversation took place, when viewed individually, may not
have a direct connection with phone content. However, when different
pieces of contact information are integrated, they can generate profiles
about the behavior of specific persons. For instance, a combination of
location data and mobile phone communication records can reveal
details of secret meetings or conversations between politicians and
lobbyists. In other words, sophisticated technologies have challenged
the content/envelope distinction test, requiring it be revised. As Justice
141. Id. ―Congress embodied [content-envelope distinction] in the law. Content
information is regulated by the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communication Act, and it is
given high-level privacy protection. Envelope information is protected by the Pen Register
Act, which provides low-level privacy protection.‖ Id.
142. Id. at 158; see also Stephanie Crawford, What is an IP address?,
HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/question549.htm
(last visited Feb. 23, 2014) (―Every machine on a network has a unique identifier. Just as
you would address a letter to send in the mail, computers use the unique identifier to
send data to specific computers on a network. Most networks today, including all
computers on the Internet, use the TCP/IP protocol as the standard for how to
communicate on the network. In the TCP/IP protocol, the unique identifier for a computer
is called its IP address.‖).
143. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (―[T]he surveillance
techniques the government employed here are constitutionally indistinguishable from the
use of a pen register that the Court approved in Smith. First, e-mail and Internet users,
like the telephone users in Smith, rely on third-party equipment in order to engage in
communication. Smith based its holding that telephone users have no expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial on the users' imputed knowledge that their calls are
completed through telephone company switching equipment. Analogously, e-mail and
Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages
or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because they should know that this
information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose
of directing the routing of information.‖).
144. See SOLOVE, supra note 139, at 158-59.
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Louis Brandeis claims, the Fourth Amendment must have a ―capacity
[for] adaptation to a changing world.‖145 Social network operator,
Facebook, has identified in its policy of Information for Law
Enforcement Authorities that location information constitutes content
information:
A search warrant issued under the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent state warrant
procedures upon a showing of probable cause is required to compel the
disclosure of the stored contents of any account, which may include
messages, photos, videos, wall posts, and location information.146

Recent legislative activity in Taiwan has proposed the
strengthening of privacy protection on traditionally non-content private
communications.147 A few months before the outcry over the United
States Senate Intelligence Committee on the United States Central
Intelligence Agency‘s accused spying activities,148 a similar dispute
occurred in Taiwan, stemming from the Taiwanese intelligence agency‘s
surveillance of the president of the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan‘s
parliament, and a number of opposing party parliament members. 149
This event led to a proposition to amend the Telecommunications Act to
impose a requirement that investigators and prosecutors obtain a
judicial-granted order before spying on individuals‘ dialed and called
telephone lines, the names of persons called, the length of the phone
conversation, and all other non-content communication records. This
proposed amendment represents the reaction to privacy challenges
under new technologies and the need to extend privacy protection to
areas that were traditionally regarded as merely a format not involving
content.

145. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
146. Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited July 28, 2014); see
also NATE CARDOZO, ET AL., WHO HAS YOUR BACK? WHICH COMPANIES HELP PROTECT
YOUR DATA FROM THE GOVERNMENT?, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION‘S THIRD
ANNUAL REPORT ON ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS‘ PRIVACY AND TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES
REGARDING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO USER DATA 9 (2013), available at
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/who-has-your-back-2013-report-20130513.pdf.
147. See 吳景欽 [Wu Jing Qin], 非關犯罪之通聯紀錄調取之疑義 [Issues of Accessing to
Personal Communication Records for Purposes Not Related to Criminal Investigation], 今
日新聞網 [NOWNEWS.COM] (Jan. 24, 2014),
http://www.ettoday.net/news/20140121/318115.htm.
148. See Adam Serwer, Senator Accuses CIA of Spying on Congress, MSNBC (Mar.
11, 2014, 10:16 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/feinstein-cia-senate.
149. See 賴又嘉 [Lai You Jia], 特偵控關說 柯建銘監聽譯文全文 [The Special
Investigation Crew Accused Ko-Chien-Ming of Engaging in Illegal Lobby; A Full
Transcript of Ko’s Conversation], 蘋果日報 [APPLE DAILY] (Sept. 6, 2013),
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20130906/254624/.
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c. Is Geo-location Data Protected under the Fourth Amendment?
In Jones, the Court decided privacy intrusions occurred due to the
police‘s physical attachment of a GPS device to a car without a search
warrant but left the question unanswered as to whether the police
surveillance was made without physical attachment of the GPS
device.150 After all, the real question is whether surveillance in public
and access to records held by a third party constitutes privacy invasion
protected by the Fourth Amendment; the type of devices used for the
surveillance should not affect the answer. Jones also by no means
suggests that had the police used a non-physically-attached device the
warrantless surveillance would have been legitimate. Before the
Supreme Court addresses this troubling issue, we must examine where
geo-location data falls on the spectrum of the above-mentioned privacy
doctrines.
It is true that geo-location data generated by GPS, mobile devices
(such as smartphones and tablet computers), and the ETC system
merely indicate the location of the devices and do not directly reveal the
identity of a person. However, similar to an IP address, which has the
important feature of indicating the device user‘s behaviors on the
Internet, geo-location data can also be easily linked to a specific person
who carries the device to track his location and movements, a new
category of personal information that did not exist before such devices
were available. The question is whether the ―location‖ or ―movement‖
shall be reviewed as content or non-content information, as the
Supreme Court has excluded non-content information from the Fourth
Amendment protection due to the less-personal-sensitive nature. Geolocation data is not just the data of the tracked devices but also that of
the specific individual and that data can disclose a person‘s social
activities and other livelihood information, which concerns one‘s private
and family life.151 Therefore, geo-location data should not be treated
the same as envelope information in terms of privacy protection.
One may argue that geo-location data concerns one‘s public
activities, and when one exposes himself to public observation, he
cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, one‘s
expectation of being watched and having every movement recorded are
two different things. Walking or driving in a public place is not
equivalent to the relinquishment of privacy entirely. One may realize
that other people in public venues can see his movement. There are
speed cameras deployed along the roads to detect and deter speeders
and red light runners. Nonetheless, this expectation is far from being
150. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
151. See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 702-16 (2011).
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put into a surveillance web through data from GPS, cell towers, or the
ETC system. Unless it has become acceptable by society for video
cameras or other surveillance devices to be set up in public places to
capture citizens‘ every movement, according to Katz, we cannot assume
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy vested in these geolocation data. Moreover, although the geo-location data is available to
mobile phone companies, GPS, or ETC operators, according to Warshak,
this does not mean that device users necessarily lose their reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, and the
government may still need a search warrant based on probable cause to
seize the geo-location data.152 Of course, different scenarios involve
various factors of the conflicts between personal privacy and the needs
of criminal investigation or other purposes, and the solution remains to
be answered by the Court.
F. GOVERNMENT‘S ROLE IN PROTECTING ETC PERSONAL DATA
The above conclusion, that the CIB has no statutory grounds to
request FE-Toll to turn over the E-Toll data is supported by the privacy
right‘s negative (or defensive) function against the government‘s
intrusion. In fact, the constitutional right to information privacy
carries a positive dimension, under which the government has an
affirmative obligation to take action to protect people‘s information
privacy.153 In a dispute concerning a conflict between the right to
privacy and the right of free press, Taiwan‘s Constitutional Court has
reaffirmed the constitutional right to information privacy and declared
that the government has an obligation to safeguard such right, even
though the infringement of privacy is not from the government but from
the private sector.154 Following this notion, in situations where private
152. Id. at 742-43 (―Under a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, location data
implicates the Fourth Amendment, and its acquisition by law enforcement should proceed
only after agents obtain a warrant based on probable cause.‖).
153. See Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Updating the Law of Information Privacy:
The New Framework of the European Union, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 605, 622–23
(2013) (―The EU Data Protection Directive requires each member state to establish a
public authority responsible for ‗monitoring the application within its territory of the
provisions adopted' . . . . Data protection authorities have an affirmative obligation to
determine which processing operations are likely to present specific risks to the rights
and freedoms of data subjects and examine them before they are commenced.‖).
154. See J.Y. Interp. No. 689, at reasoning ¶ 6 (July 29, 2011) (Taiwan), translated in
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/eng/FINT/FINTQRY03.asp?Y1=2011&M1=&D1=&Y2=&M2=
&D2=&cno=&kw=&btnSubmit=Search&sdate=20110000&edate=99991231&keyword=&p
age=3&total=35&seq=30 (―[T]he liberty to be free from intrusion in the public sphere can
only be asserted when it can be reasonably expected; that is, the expectation of nonintrusion must not only be manifested but also deemed reasonable by the general public.
The Provision at issue has met the constitutional requirement of the State to guarantee
the aforementioned rights and liberties.‖).
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companies take the initiative to voluntarily sell personal data to public
agencies, the latter is prohibited under the Taiwan Constitution to buy
such data if the disclosure is not authorized by the data subject or by
other laws.155 Furthermore, when the Taiwan‘s National Freeway
Bureau (NFB) contracted FE-Toll to operate the ETC system, the NFB
had a constitutional obligation to carefully evaluate the privacy
implications when a conglomerate controls the entire nations‘ driver
data, or at least the government should find ways to avoid or mitigate
the negative privacy implications. Failure to perform the privacy
safeguarding obligation constitutes a violation of the duty of the
respective agency to safeguard people‘s interest in information privacy.
The government does not seem to have fulfilled the affirmative
obligation to protect the right to privacy by allowing FE-Toll and its
shareholder to control drivers‘ data regarding the use of highways and
all major roads in the entire nation without limitation. FE-Toll‘s major
shareholder, Far EasTone Telecommunications Co. Ltd. (FET), is one of
the major providers in Taiwan‘s mobile service market and has recently
been selected by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications to
construct and operate the Integrated Traffic Service Cloud project
(December, 2013).156 The Traffic Cloud is intended to integrate all
traffic information gathered by all road agencies across Taiwan and to
systematically analyze the traffic information in order to provide real
time traffic and travel information and alerts to citizens. 157 By winning
the bid to undertake the Traffic Cloud project, FET can control all
information gathered through roadway surveillance and traffic cameras
originally collected and managed by the respective public sectors. FET
also has access to public transportation networks including metro, bus,
and train travel across cities and counties. In addition to officially
taking over public sector information, FET may also exercise its right as
a contractor of the Traffic Cloud to install traffic cameras on all city and
county roads to conduct surveillance on all vehicles 24 hours a day, 365
days a year.158 FE-Toll and FET together will control nearly one
hundred percent of the traffic surveillance data of all major levels of
roads across the country.159
With the government controls the drivers‘ data, there are already
fears of inadequate processing of personal data because the
implementation of privacy laws cannot provide full assurance that no
155. Id.
156. See 朱致宜 [Zhu Zhi Yi], 個資看透透 徐旭東變「全民公敵」？ [Surveillance of
Personal Data Shu-Shu-Dong Becomes All Citizens’ Enemy?], 財訊 [WEALTH MAG.] (Jan.
15, 2014), https://www.wealth.com.tw/index2.aspx?f=301&id=3915.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.

2014]

EYES ON THE ROAD PROGRAM IN TAIWAN

187

breach of security will occur. The government‘s outsourcing of the
management of said data has made personal data more vulnerable
because the laws limiting the government‘s use of personal data is not
applicable to private sectors.160 The relationship between private data
controller and data subject will mostly be decided by contracts (such as
ETC user contracts). In reality, whether individuals can obtain
sufficient and genuine privacy protection from these contracts is highly
doubtful when businesses‘ bargaining power is far greater than the
individual customers.
Putting aside FET‘s Integrated Traffic Service Cloud project and
only focusing on the ETC program, the government is not doing enough
to safeguard people‘s right to information privacy. After the
implementation of the ETC system, the national highway toll system
has completely converted to e-toll lanes, and all manual fee payment
routes have been removed. This policy is tantamount to forcing all
highway users to accept monitoring by the ETC. The policy makers
have failed to consider whether there is an inequality in the bargaining
position between FE-Toll and highway drivers because FE-Toll controls
the highway entrance and citizens will be denied access to the highways
if they do not accept the terms of the conditions set by FE-Toll. In such
a situation, the government has a constitutional obligation to step in
and scrutinize the one-sided contract to protect people‘s privacy and
require FE-Toll to implement and maintain adequate measures for
confidentiality and security to protect personal privacy. Unfortunately,
at the time of writing, the government does not seem to have fulfilled
such obligations.
The Internet combined with mobile devices has formed a pervasive
surveillance net, and it is nearly impossible to escape from it.
Businesses have greater capabilities to track, maintain, and analyze
data to profile digital dossiers of individuals (digital persons).161 The
160. See Personal Information Protection Act art. 15, 19. The PDPA distinguishes
public and private sectors when setting out rules for the sectors‘ collection, process and
use of personal data. For example, Article 15 of the PDPA applies to government agencies
to regulate their actions related to data collection and use, whereas Article 19 apples to
private sectors‘ collection and use of personal data. Id.
161. ―Digital person‖ concept is introduced by Professor Daniel J. Solove. In his book,
The Digital Person, he indicates that:
[d]igital technology enables the preservation of the minutia of our everyday
comings and goings, of our likes and dislikes, of who are and what we own.
It is ever more possible to create an electronic collage that covers much of a
person‘s life—a life captured in records, a digital person composed in the
collective computer networks of the world.
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 1 (2004).
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new information technology allows the linkage of geo-location data with
identity, significantly reducing the possibility for individuals to be left
alone.162 Individual choice is no longer a valid form of privacy
protection. The ETC case is the perfect real life example to illustrate
the challenges to information privacy under the widespread use of
advanced technology. The launch of ETC has forced all drivers to use
electronic toll collection lanes and deprived people of their privacy
rights if they decide to use the national highway system. It is essential
that there be specific and articulated grounds to force people to give up
their privacy to use the highways, and these grounds should meet the
requirement of necessity and the principle of proportionality. The
government should not be in a role to abet a conglomerate in obtaining
personal data to expand its business territory without giving the
individual a choice over his personal information, which constitutes a
violation of the duty of the government stipulated in Article 22 of the
Taiwanese Constitution.163 If there is a compelling public interest
behind the sweeping collection of people‘s vehicle data, due to the
government‘s obligation to protect people‘s information privacy under
the Constitution, the government should actively supervise the
formation of the ETC users‘ contractual clauses instead of allowing FEToll to unilaterally decide the terms and conditions. Furthermore, it
should impose obligations on FE-Toll to implement and maintain
adequate controls of the E-Toll data‘s security, and it should require
FE-Toll‘s full cooperation with regulatory investigations and audits for
ongoing privacy protection assurance.
IV. CONCLUSION
Information technology is moving forward at full speed. The same
day the author finished the final draft of this article, Facebook unveiled
a new innovation, ―Nearby Friends,‖ which allows its users to track
their friends‘ location in real time. 164 With this feature, Facebook users
now share more details about their geo-location data. We have to
realize that the pace of law making can never equal the pace of
technology advances. Seeking to craft laws for information privacy
protection following every move of technology innovation is a long shot
and is likely to miss the target. As fast and diverse as technologies can
162. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890) (―the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,- the right
to be let alone.‖).
163. Article 22 of Taiwanese Constitution provides that ―All other freedoms and
rights of the people that are not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be
guaranteed under the Constitution.‖ Minguo Xianfa art. 22 (1947) (Taiwan), available at
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL000001.
164. See Tsukayama, supra note 134.
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be, it is vital to reconsider the core value of privacy in the rapidly
changing technology era and to clarify the concept of information
privacy in a way that it can withstand technology innovations.
United States privacy legislation is sector-centered and does not
have a single omnibus information privacy protection law. There are
fragmented statutory protections for selected types of personal
information, such as financial privacy, educational records, health data,
telecommunications and marketing, online privacy and workplace
privacy. Geo-location data does not seem to be regulated under these
categories.
The current U.S. information privacy law has gaps
regarding geo-location data protection. For example, if United States
government agencies want to adopt a similar bulk vehicle data
surveillance program to collect geo-location data or to seek access to
geo-location data if they are collected by companies, there will be at
least two issues regarding the applicability of the Fourth Amendment:
whether geo-location data concerns the content of personal
communication and shall receive higher protection than envelope
information and how to treat geo-location data under the third-party
doctrine. Whether Fourth Amendment protection will be afforded to
individuals concerning geo-location data is still unknown. Lacking a
comprehensive law, data subjects will have to address the variety of
privacy laws to seek protection, especially for the new type of
information. A common criticism is that gaps can occur in the
fragmental approach and that unregulated segments will face privacy
threats when legislation lags behind technological innovations.
As a comparative law perspective, the Taiwanese information
privacy law approach to adopt a comprehensive privacy protection
model could be an option for United States information privacy reform
to better protect information privacy. Of course, the comprehensive
privacy law approach has its own disadvantages, and there are debates
in Taiwan about whether the government‘s access of geo-location data
requires search warrants. The level of strictness of legal instruments
depends on the legal risk nations are willing to accept, which is not the
focus of this essay. Nonetheless, an omnibus model ensures a basic
level of privacy protection for most data and serves to prevent gaps in
privacy protection for new data yielded by new technologies. For
companies that wish to lawfully collect and use data, a comprehensive
standard sets the line of personal information gathering and use,
especially when new devices are involved. Another immediate benefit is
that when the government is making requests to companies to turn over
customers‘ information, companies have a legal basis to decide whether
to comply with such requests, especially when some agencies attempt to
evade their compliance obligation in direct information gathering from
the data subject and instead requesting that companies turn over data.
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Enterprises are driven by potential business opportunities to upgrade
technologies to facilitate data collection and analysis, and they appear
to possess more personal data than government does. For individuals,
such an omnibus privacy law can offer certain protection against
privacy invasions by giant corporations‘.

